The Dieppe Raid
August 19th 1942
"A desperate raid at a desperate time"
Major Brian McCool, the Principle Military Landing Officer, was captured and interrogated for two days. A German officer speaking perfect English said to him:
“Look McCool, it was too big for a raid and too small for an invasion. What was it?”
To which McCool replied “if you can tell me the answer I would be grateful”.
McCool had stated in one sentence what was later to become the long lasting enigma of the Dieppe Raid; what exactly was it all for?
“Look McCool, it was too big for a raid and too small for an invasion. What was it?”
To which McCool replied “if you can tell me the answer I would be grateful”.
McCool had stated in one sentence what was later to become the long lasting enigma of the Dieppe Raid; what exactly was it all for?
Dieppe from a pre war postcard. The main landing beach is clearly seen as is the casino in the fore ground.
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Dieppe harbour from a pre war aerial photograph. What were to become "red" and "white" beaches can clearly be seen.
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300 Ships, 800 Aircraft, 6,000 men the largest attacking force yet assembled during the war and the biggest event for the RAF since the Battle of Britain.
Operation “Rutter” was the original raid planned to be a simpler Commando attack but this was cancelled for 4th July 1942 mainly due to persistent bad weather.
Operation “Jubilee” was reinstated by 16th August as the “Dieppe Raid” much to the annoyance of the men taking part as this was seen as a sign of ill omen.
The so called objective was to seize the port for one tidal period, 6 hours; destroy the coastal defence batteries on either side of the port and then make an orderly retreat. The Freya Radar station on the western headland was also to be attacked with parts of interest captured for return to England. One comment as of 1980 was that an order existed to capture all the unused invasion barges moored up in Dieppe harbour and bring them back to England, clearly ludicrous in the extreme.
It was to be a five pronged attack on 8 coastal locations; Eastern outer flank: Berneval, Yellow 1 and 2; Western outer flank: Vasterival, Orange 1 and 2. Eastern inner flank: Puys, Blue. Western inner flank: Pourville, Green. Then the main assault on both Red and White beaches in front of the town.
Blue Beach at Puys, proved to be a terrible disaster with 94% of all the men landing there becoming casualties mainly because of the loss of surprise in landing late and in full daylight.
In total the allies lost 963 dead, 2,400 wounded, 2,240 POW’s. The Germans lost 345 dead and 268 wounded; though nearly 2,000 troops returned to England most of these were in the reserve force that did not land though the contemporary press as a moral booster, claimed that these men had returned as heroes for hitting the Germans hard.
Exact Numbers: Canadians= 906 killed (56 Officers & 851 ORs) Of 5,000 men who sailed into battle 3,367 were killed, wounded or captures.
Commandos counted 270 killed, wounded, captured. Royal Navy 550.
Upon the death toll it seems that had the raid been successful then killing 1,000 plus men would have saved many millions. The same decision though on a much larger scale, that the American's were faced with when planning the invasion of mainland Japan verses using the atomic bomb in 1945.
Operation “Rutter” was the original raid planned to be a simpler Commando attack but this was cancelled for 4th July 1942 mainly due to persistent bad weather.
Operation “Jubilee” was reinstated by 16th August as the “Dieppe Raid” much to the annoyance of the men taking part as this was seen as a sign of ill omen.
The so called objective was to seize the port for one tidal period, 6 hours; destroy the coastal defence batteries on either side of the port and then make an orderly retreat. The Freya Radar station on the western headland was also to be attacked with parts of interest captured for return to England. One comment as of 1980 was that an order existed to capture all the unused invasion barges moored up in Dieppe harbour and bring them back to England, clearly ludicrous in the extreme.
It was to be a five pronged attack on 8 coastal locations; Eastern outer flank: Berneval, Yellow 1 and 2; Western outer flank: Vasterival, Orange 1 and 2. Eastern inner flank: Puys, Blue. Western inner flank: Pourville, Green. Then the main assault on both Red and White beaches in front of the town.
Blue Beach at Puys, proved to be a terrible disaster with 94% of all the men landing there becoming casualties mainly because of the loss of surprise in landing late and in full daylight.
In total the allies lost 963 dead, 2,400 wounded, 2,240 POW’s. The Germans lost 345 dead and 268 wounded; though nearly 2,000 troops returned to England most of these were in the reserve force that did not land though the contemporary press as a moral booster, claimed that these men had returned as heroes for hitting the Germans hard.
Exact Numbers: Canadians= 906 killed (56 Officers & 851 ORs) Of 5,000 men who sailed into battle 3,367 were killed, wounded or captures.
Commandos counted 270 killed, wounded, captured. Royal Navy 550.
Upon the death toll it seems that had the raid been successful then killing 1,000 plus men would have saved many millions. The same decision though on a much larger scale, that the American's were faced with when planning the invasion of mainland Japan verses using the atomic bomb in 1945.
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Dieppe reconnaissance photography was comprehensive; Top: a montage view of the eastern coast as seen from seaward. Left: High resolution vertical overlay onto a modern Google Earth image. Right: A PRU high altitude vertical photograph. The intelligence gathered was unfortunately fatally flawed, having completely missed the numerous German defensive bunkers dug into the cliffs over looking main beach.
A low oblique recon. photograph showing the German defences around the harbour entrance. It was through here that HMS Locust with 30 IAU were to pass to get to their objectives.
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Dieppe's Avant Harbour with a large quantity of invasion barges moored around the perimeter.
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The question for Dieppe after all these years is Why? And much has been written trying to answer this question. Some theories:
But in reality, for 75 years no one really knew what the raid was for with many historical written accounts only fluttering over missing facts. So these questions still remain:
- It was a test for D-Day to learn lessons about frontal beach assaults.
- To see if an occupied port could be captured and held.
- To appease Stalin who was pushing the allies for a second front to be opened in Europe to take the pressure off the Russians in the East thereby forcing the Germans to fight on two fronts.
- It was planned to give the Canadians much needed battle experience prior to sending them off to other theatres of war such as North Africa.
- It was designed to fail to make both America and Russia acutely aware that attacking Europe in 1942 was impossible and thereby making the USA commit more to the war effort.
But in reality, for 75 years no one really knew what the raid was for with many historical written accounts only fluttering over missing facts. So these questions still remain:
- What was Dieppe actually about?
- What was the main objective for such a massive effort?
- Why was the expectedly high death toll deemed worth the risk?
- Why have much of the facts been covered up for 75 years?
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The wealth of recently declassified documents has begun to open up the real story behind the Dieppe raid. Above are just two. Left: the proposal to form an intelligence commando unit. Right: The document that started off the hunt for the truth about the raid. Both uncovered in the National Archives by David O'Keefe.
Why Dieppe
A spurious SIGINT = Signals Intelligence document held by the National Archives mentions that “Dieppe Objective Not Realised”. What does Signals Intelligence want with the Dieppe Raid? In early 1942 a special unit called “30 A.U.” (Assault Unit) was set up in response to a similar German unit that had had much success during the invasions of Greece and Crete; their job had been to mop up all the intelligence that could be found after the main attacking troops had moved through an area and destroyed it. 30 A.U. was to be a sort of commando unit working to do just the same to the Germans and it was created by non other than Naval Commander Ian Fleming of James Bond fame.
It turns out that Ian Fleming had a lot of influence while working for the admiralty in London. He was part of the Naval Intelligence Division, N.I.D. and was Chief Liaison Officer for NID working out of room 39 at the admiralty in Whitehall, London. He was also the PA to the head of Naval Intelligence Admiral John Godfrey. Ian Fleming was also very well connected to groups such as: Joint Intelligence Committee; Political Warfare Executive; Special Operations Executive; Special Intelligence Service. He was also cleared to the very top levels of British Intelligence including “Ultra” and Bletchley Park. In fact Commander Ian Fleming was British Naval Intelligence and it was this remarkable man that created in March 1942, 30 AU.
Along side this Ian Fleming was also privy to a very special group set up by Admiral John Godfrey called the “Inter Service Topographical Department” (ISTD). There job was to research possible enemy targets and work up extensive intelligence gathering on them including photo recon, mapping, surveying, and even collecting pre war postcards and tourist brochures; anything that would help to build up an extensive target dossier for possible bombing or raiding.
On the 5th April 1942 Dieppe was highlighted as of some interest.
On 14th April 1942 ISTD, Commander Ian Fleming and room 39 NID issued three copies of a top secret highly detailed report to the government officials at Whitehall concerning an urgent target that needed sanctioning for immediate attack and within days it was approved by Lord Louis Mountbatten as the next scheduled major target. It was indeed the same small fishing port on the northern French coast; Dieppe. So what was so important about Dieppe?
On one report it was noted that 30AU had been described as “Authorised Looters” for the Admiralty. Their Job was to go in with the regular assault troops and steal any documents that might be useful to British Intelligence before the Germans could destroy them. They were highly trained men who knew what to look for and how best to disguise the purpose of stealing from under the German's noses; so if 30AU had an interest in Dieppe what exactly was it they wanted?
A spurious SIGINT = Signals Intelligence document held by the National Archives mentions that “Dieppe Objective Not Realised”. What does Signals Intelligence want with the Dieppe Raid? In early 1942 a special unit called “30 A.U.” (Assault Unit) was set up in response to a similar German unit that had had much success during the invasions of Greece and Crete; their job had been to mop up all the intelligence that could be found after the main attacking troops had moved through an area and destroyed it. 30 A.U. was to be a sort of commando unit working to do just the same to the Germans and it was created by non other than Naval Commander Ian Fleming of James Bond fame.
It turns out that Ian Fleming had a lot of influence while working for the admiralty in London. He was part of the Naval Intelligence Division, N.I.D. and was Chief Liaison Officer for NID working out of room 39 at the admiralty in Whitehall, London. He was also the PA to the head of Naval Intelligence Admiral John Godfrey. Ian Fleming was also very well connected to groups such as: Joint Intelligence Committee; Political Warfare Executive; Special Operations Executive; Special Intelligence Service. He was also cleared to the very top levels of British Intelligence including “Ultra” and Bletchley Park. In fact Commander Ian Fleming was British Naval Intelligence and it was this remarkable man that created in March 1942, 30 AU.
Along side this Ian Fleming was also privy to a very special group set up by Admiral John Godfrey called the “Inter Service Topographical Department” (ISTD). There job was to research possible enemy targets and work up extensive intelligence gathering on them including photo recon, mapping, surveying, and even collecting pre war postcards and tourist brochures; anything that would help to build up an extensive target dossier for possible bombing or raiding.
On the 5th April 1942 Dieppe was highlighted as of some interest.
On 14th April 1942 ISTD, Commander Ian Fleming and room 39 NID issued three copies of a top secret highly detailed report to the government officials at Whitehall concerning an urgent target that needed sanctioning for immediate attack and within days it was approved by Lord Louis Mountbatten as the next scheduled major target. It was indeed the same small fishing port on the northern French coast; Dieppe. So what was so important about Dieppe?
On one report it was noted that 30AU had been described as “Authorised Looters” for the Admiralty. Their Job was to go in with the regular assault troops and steal any documents that might be useful to British Intelligence before the Germans could destroy them. They were highly trained men who knew what to look for and how best to disguise the purpose of stealing from under the German's noses; so if 30AU had an interest in Dieppe what exactly was it they wanted?
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Left; LCP's being loaded with men prior to the assault. Right; a stranded LCP full of dead soldiers on main beach.
Ultra
Throughout 1941 the Bletchley Park code breakers had successfully broken the German 3 rotor Enigma ciphers and Britain was able to plan its defence strategy with the luxury of being able to read all the radio intelligence being sent to and from German units in Europe; this included all the U-Boats operating in the North Atlantic. The ability to do this was not only the most closely guarded secret of the war but an exceptionally valuable asset in Britain’s ability to wage war at all.
But on 1st February 1942 all this suddenly changed: Bletchley Park was rendered over night totally blind to German Intelligence traffic full stop. Throughout the spring shipping losses increased dramatically, Hitler’s command of Europe took on massive gains in territory and Britain’s ability to wage war was becoming more and more untenable; Germany was winning hands down and if this was to continue throughout 1942 a starving and defenceless Britain would be capitulating by the years end.
Why? The Germans had introduced the 4 rotor Enigma machine and in one stroke rendered British Intelligence blind; the combinations of code were now so enormous with this new additional rotor that all German coded radio traffic was considered unbreakable. And what’s more the new 4 rotor sets were being rapidly introduced to the Atlantic U-Boat fleets, the Channel shipping raiders, the major battleships such as Tirpitz and even worse the whole German Mediterranean fleet thereby threatening the planned allied invasion of North Africa, “Operation Torch” set for late 1942.
This was in Churchill’s words, “The worse possible scenario for Britain”.
Throughout 1941 the Bletchley Park code breakers had successfully broken the German 3 rotor Enigma ciphers and Britain was able to plan its defence strategy with the luxury of being able to read all the radio intelligence being sent to and from German units in Europe; this included all the U-Boats operating in the North Atlantic. The ability to do this was not only the most closely guarded secret of the war but an exceptionally valuable asset in Britain’s ability to wage war at all.
But on 1st February 1942 all this suddenly changed: Bletchley Park was rendered over night totally blind to German Intelligence traffic full stop. Throughout the spring shipping losses increased dramatically, Hitler’s command of Europe took on massive gains in territory and Britain’s ability to wage war was becoming more and more untenable; Germany was winning hands down and if this was to continue throughout 1942 a starving and defenceless Britain would be capitulating by the years end.
Why? The Germans had introduced the 4 rotor Enigma machine and in one stroke rendered British Intelligence blind; the combinations of code were now so enormous with this new additional rotor that all German coded radio traffic was considered unbreakable. And what’s more the new 4 rotor sets were being rapidly introduced to the Atlantic U-Boat fleets, the Channel shipping raiders, the major battleships such as Tirpitz and even worse the whole German Mediterranean fleet thereby threatening the planned allied invasion of North Africa, “Operation Torch” set for late 1942.
This was in Churchill’s words, “The worse possible scenario for Britain”.
Combined Intelligence Unit aerial photograph dated 2nd June 1942. We have marked the location of the German Naval HQ. Also of note are the numerous invasion barges moored up from the cancelled "Operation Sealion".
Pinch It
As of NID’s report of 14th April 1942 the word from Bletchley Park was still “No Progress Made” and the rest of 1942 was beginning to look very bleak indeed; a fact not missed by German Propaganda which woefully said that Britain was “on the toboggan to defeat”.
For desperate times something desperate had to be done and quickly, while the question for Bletchley Park was simple “how do we crack the German 4 rotor coded ciphers?
Answer: let’s steal a 4 rotor machine and all its attendant code books!
But to do this what was needed was a cover raid on enemy soil where the material requested by Bletchley Park was known to be used and be undertaken in such a manor that it could be secretly stolen without the Germans knowing or even suspecting that it had been taken; this last bit was critical because any doubt what so ever would simple prompt the Germans into changing all their codes and the raid would be an instant shambles.
Who would be qualified to undertake such a raid? Non other than Flemings 30AU now re designated 30 Intelligence Assault Unit (IAU). Further more to disguise the job of 30 IAU it was to become for the duration of such a raid part of 40 Royal Marine Commando (commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph Phillips) and led by the impeccable and ex Eton school boy Lt H.O. Huntington-Whitely. This unit was to be trained up to undertake what was now formally to be called a “Pinch Raid”. But pinch from where?
The ISTD back in April 1942 during their extensive research had come up with an address, Hotel Moderne, 21 Rue Vauquelin, Dieppe. This address was designated No.2 on the target map being assembled at that time; it was non other than the German Naval Headquarters for Northern Coastal France.
And what was likely to be found in a naval headquarters? The latest 4 rotor Enigma machines and all accompanying coded ciphers for months ahead; this then would be the perfect “Pinch” location for Flemings 30IAU.
How important was this in 1942? Only the saviour and salvation of Great Britain and what it might cost in lives was simply irrelevant.
As of NID’s report of 14th April 1942 the word from Bletchley Park was still “No Progress Made” and the rest of 1942 was beginning to look very bleak indeed; a fact not missed by German Propaganda which woefully said that Britain was “on the toboggan to defeat”.
For desperate times something desperate had to be done and quickly, while the question for Bletchley Park was simple “how do we crack the German 4 rotor coded ciphers?
Answer: let’s steal a 4 rotor machine and all its attendant code books!
But to do this what was needed was a cover raid on enemy soil where the material requested by Bletchley Park was known to be used and be undertaken in such a manor that it could be secretly stolen without the Germans knowing or even suspecting that it had been taken; this last bit was critical because any doubt what so ever would simple prompt the Germans into changing all their codes and the raid would be an instant shambles.
Who would be qualified to undertake such a raid? Non other than Flemings 30AU now re designated 30 Intelligence Assault Unit (IAU). Further more to disguise the job of 30 IAU it was to become for the duration of such a raid part of 40 Royal Marine Commando (commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph Phillips) and led by the impeccable and ex Eton school boy Lt H.O. Huntington-Whitely. This unit was to be trained up to undertake what was now formally to be called a “Pinch Raid”. But pinch from where?
The ISTD back in April 1942 during their extensive research had come up with an address, Hotel Moderne, 21 Rue Vauquelin, Dieppe. This address was designated No.2 on the target map being assembled at that time; it was non other than the German Naval Headquarters for Northern Coastal France.
And what was likely to be found in a naval headquarters? The latest 4 rotor Enigma machines and all accompanying coded ciphers for months ahead; this then would be the perfect “Pinch” location for Flemings 30IAU.
How important was this in 1942? Only the saviour and salvation of Great Britain and what it might cost in lives was simply irrelevant.
The location of the German Naval HQ was just a short dash from the landing beaches. But HMS Locust was ordered to enter into the outer basin and disembark 30 IAU right next to the Fish Market.
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A detailed view of 30 IAU's primary target. Number 2 on the objectives list.
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No.10 Platoon "X" Company RM Commando, May 1942. Probably taken while training on the Isle of Wight. These are the men of 30 IAU with Lt. Huntington-Whiteley seated middle with cap and stick.
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Two assault maps showing the military plan: Left; that published for public consumption in the Illustrated London News. Right; the one to be issued to the troops who would actually land. There are many "probables" on this plan but more importantly the Allies failed to appreciated just how good a defensive battle the Germans would fight.
The Planned Assault
This was to be the first use of a “Combined Operations” attack strategy.
The Navy were to supply 8 destroyers and all the landing craft and support shipping. This included HMS Calpe,HQ Ship. HMS Fernie, deputy HQ ship. HMS Locust a flat bottomed converted river gun boat and the raiding ship for 40RM Commando.
The RAF and newly arrived USAAF were to supply support air cover and diversionary bombing of Luftwaffe airfields in the area Abbeville/Drucat.
The landing force would be:
Canadian 4th Infantry Brigade = Royal Regiment of Canada. Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Essex Scottish Regiment.
Canadian 6th Infantry Brigade = Fusiliers Mont Royal. Cameron Highlanders of Canada. South Saskatchewan Regiment. Canadian 14th Tank Battalion = (Calgary Tanks).
And small units of both the Black Watch of Canada and the 1st US Rangers.
British: 3 Commando. 4 Commando and Royal Marine A Commando disguising 40RM with Lt Huntington-Whitely leading 30IAU.
Totalling around 6,000 men it has been deduced from newly declassified files that about 50% of this force were detailed to retrieve German Intelligence documents and 40RM (30IAU) had absolute priority.
The Dieppe Raid was not then, just a “Raid” it was all about capturing vital intelligence under the cover of a combined services attack; that is what the Dieppe objective was really about!
This was to be the first use of a “Combined Operations” attack strategy.
The Navy were to supply 8 destroyers and all the landing craft and support shipping. This included HMS Calpe,HQ Ship. HMS Fernie, deputy HQ ship. HMS Locust a flat bottomed converted river gun boat and the raiding ship for 40RM Commando.
The RAF and newly arrived USAAF were to supply support air cover and diversionary bombing of Luftwaffe airfields in the area Abbeville/Drucat.
The landing force would be:
Canadian 4th Infantry Brigade = Royal Regiment of Canada. Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. Essex Scottish Regiment.
Canadian 6th Infantry Brigade = Fusiliers Mont Royal. Cameron Highlanders of Canada. South Saskatchewan Regiment. Canadian 14th Tank Battalion = (Calgary Tanks).
And small units of both the Black Watch of Canada and the 1st US Rangers.
British: 3 Commando. 4 Commando and Royal Marine A Commando disguising 40RM with Lt Huntington-Whitely leading 30IAU.
Totalling around 6,000 men it has been deduced from newly declassified files that about 50% of this force were detailed to retrieve German Intelligence documents and 40RM (30IAU) had absolute priority.
The Dieppe Raid was not then, just a “Raid” it was all about capturing vital intelligence under the cover of a combined services attack; that is what the Dieppe objective was really about!
The main assault plan as it stood on the morning of the raid.
Key Ships
HMS Locust and Admiral R.E.D. Ryder VC. ex St Nazaire Raid 28th March 1942.
It was Ryder who led and subsequently crashed HMS Campbeltown into the lock gates prior to the ship exploding thereby destroying the only dry dock able to accommodate the Tirpitz. For his contribution to this daring raid he was awarded the VC. He was the perfect man to under take a similar mission at Dieppe.
HMS Fernie, Deputy HQ Ship with Cmdr Ian Fleming on Board. None of the official records mention that Fleming was anywhere near Dieppe on the 19th August but secret reports show that he was and just 1000 yds off the beaches.
HMS Calpe with Major General John H. Roberts who had to make difficult decisions as the attack by HMS Locust began to fail. He sent in his floating reserve The Fusiliers Mont-Royal. They were to escort 40RM across Red Beach and into the town to locate the German Naval HQ; they didn’t make it and were virtually wiped out trying with 40RM retiring back to waiting off shore vessels.
HMS Locust and Admiral R.E.D. Ryder VC. ex St Nazaire Raid 28th March 1942.
It was Ryder who led and subsequently crashed HMS Campbeltown into the lock gates prior to the ship exploding thereby destroying the only dry dock able to accommodate the Tirpitz. For his contribution to this daring raid he was awarded the VC. He was the perfect man to under take a similar mission at Dieppe.
HMS Fernie, Deputy HQ Ship with Cmdr Ian Fleming on Board. None of the official records mention that Fleming was anywhere near Dieppe on the 19th August but secret reports show that he was and just 1000 yds off the beaches.
HMS Calpe with Major General John H. Roberts who had to make difficult decisions as the attack by HMS Locust began to fail. He sent in his floating reserve The Fusiliers Mont-Royal. They were to escort 40RM across Red Beach and into the town to locate the German Naval HQ; they didn’t make it and were virtually wiped out trying with 40RM retiring back to waiting off shore vessels.
Admiral R.E.D. Ryder VC. He commanded HMS Campbeltown ramming the ship into the lock gates at St. Nazaire in March 1942. His courage under fire and determination to succeed labeled him the perfect man for the Dieppe Raid. |
HMS Locust commanded by Ryder. The flat bottomed river gun boat that was to have forced its way into Dieppe's Avant harbour to deliver 30 IAU to their targets.
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The assault plan for main beach suggests all was well in hand presenting an easy job. In reality few troops got off the beach at all.
INSET: A PRU photograph taken on 29th August 1944 shortly before the town was finally liberated.
Here is a short summary of how the raid was supposed to proceed:-
1) The two outer flank attacks on Yellow 1 & 2 eastern and Orange 1 & 2 western were to target the two coastal gun batteries of Goebbels (Yellow) and Hess (Orange) thereby preventing them from engaging the allied invasion fleet as they moved closer inshore.
2) The two inner flank attacks at Blue eastern and Green western were to move around toward each side of the port and neutralise the harbour defences. Green flank was also to attack the Freya Radar station and capture any important equipment deemed useful.
3) The main assault would then hit Red & White beaches directly in front of Dieppe with the Essex Scottish on Red Beach moving into the town to push out the German defenders and the Calgary Tank Battalion on White Beach pushing their tank force also into the town to give strong supporting fire. The Essex Scottish was also under orders to search all moored vessels in the harbour for useful intelligence. Dieppe was also the head quarters base for the German Channel Minesweepers.
4) Only when all this had been successfully accomplished would HMS Locust (with its shallow draft) with 17 officers and 352 OR’s of 40RM (including 30IAU) sail through the port entrance and into the inner harbour. There it would stop, off load its Commando force and at just a short walk away, 30IAU would locate and enter the German Naval HQ Building at Hotel Moderne. All the while being protected by the tanks and the infantry who had arrived via main beach. The remaining members of 40RM would search all moored vessels and appropriate buildings for further intelligence gathering.
5) Once the “Booty” had been secured the code word “Bullion” was to be radioed back to HMS Calpe and Lt Huntington –Whitely alone would be picked up by a small boat and evacuated from the port complete with the booty. He was then to deliver all this captured intelligence directly into the arms of Cmdr Fleming onboard HMS Fernie who would then take the fastest route back to Britain and ultimately deliver it to Bletchley Park.
6) The RAF were then ordered to bomb the port extensively while a squadron of Blenheim aircraft was to lay a large smoke screen to cover the evacuation of all the troops by sea from the town.
7) If all had gone as planned then the Germans would have assumed the raid was an attack on the gun positions and the radar station combined with harassment attacks in force upon the harbour fortifications.
8) The later RAF bombing of the town would destroy and cover up any evidence that this had just been a pinch raid to steal German Naval Intelligence.
Assuming the ruse had worked and the Germans did not think it wise to update their code books anyway, then Bletchley Park and Ultra would for a least awhile, be able to crack the 4 rotor Enigma and resume the reading of all encrypted radio traffic as they had been able to do in 1941. This act alone would have secured “Operation Torch”, the invasion of North Africa; protected our Atlantic supply routes from the U-Boat menace and enable Britain to stay well and truly at the fore front of the war, all for a negligible cost in human losses.
BUT: despite five months of intense planning; the raid failed miserably.
Why?
A combined mass of faults, over restrictive planning, poor security (the Germans new the raid was coming; double agents in France, agents at Newhaven port and Luftwaffe Recon flights spotted the shipping build up at Newhaven Port), the wrong tools (Churchill tanks were under gunned and not suited to chert pebble beaches) and weapons (they had nothing more powerful than the navies 4 inch guns), insufficient support from naval destroyers, lack of air superiority by RAF, very poor intelligence of dispositions for German defences in the port which totally missed the many cave emplacements in the cliffs overlooking main beach.
Not a single piece of German Intelligence made it out of Dieppe at all. But ironically both Brig. William Southam and Brig. Sherwood Lett landed on White Beach each with a full copy of the entire Jubilee military battle plan under their arms in waterproof packages. One of these was in German hands by nightfall and it basically told the German's the exact objectives for the assault; or did it?
The Germans were deeply suspicious of these documents and expressed the opinion that it was probably a deceptive plant. When one looks at this from what we now know of the raid then this almost certainly was; being used to draw the Germans away from the real purpose of the raid, the pinching of a naval 4 Rotor Enigma machine.
One can be more certain that this was indeed the case because of the function of a little known order within that same battle plan; this stated that “Where ever possible, prisoner’s hands will be tied to prevent destruction of their documents”.
This had a terrible knock on effect for the captured Canadian soldiers as the Germans felt that this was barbaric and contravened the Geneva Convention for the fair treatment of POW’s. As a result of this all Canadian POWs’ from the raid were to have their hands shackled from 8th October onward during daylight hours and this was enforced for exactly 1 year, 44 days and 45 minutes. Though after Red Cross intervention this ruling was some what relaxed in some camps.
If the battle plan that fell into German hands was a plant then what better way of informing British Intelligence that the plant had succeeded when reports from Canadian POW’s confirmed the hand shackling directive in response to the “barbaric” order contained in those very same documents?
1) The two outer flank attacks on Yellow 1 & 2 eastern and Orange 1 & 2 western were to target the two coastal gun batteries of Goebbels (Yellow) and Hess (Orange) thereby preventing them from engaging the allied invasion fleet as they moved closer inshore.
2) The two inner flank attacks at Blue eastern and Green western were to move around toward each side of the port and neutralise the harbour defences. Green flank was also to attack the Freya Radar station and capture any important equipment deemed useful.
3) The main assault would then hit Red & White beaches directly in front of Dieppe with the Essex Scottish on Red Beach moving into the town to push out the German defenders and the Calgary Tank Battalion on White Beach pushing their tank force also into the town to give strong supporting fire. The Essex Scottish was also under orders to search all moored vessels in the harbour for useful intelligence. Dieppe was also the head quarters base for the German Channel Minesweepers.
4) Only when all this had been successfully accomplished would HMS Locust (with its shallow draft) with 17 officers and 352 OR’s of 40RM (including 30IAU) sail through the port entrance and into the inner harbour. There it would stop, off load its Commando force and at just a short walk away, 30IAU would locate and enter the German Naval HQ Building at Hotel Moderne. All the while being protected by the tanks and the infantry who had arrived via main beach. The remaining members of 40RM would search all moored vessels and appropriate buildings for further intelligence gathering.
5) Once the “Booty” had been secured the code word “Bullion” was to be radioed back to HMS Calpe and Lt Huntington –Whitely alone would be picked up by a small boat and evacuated from the port complete with the booty. He was then to deliver all this captured intelligence directly into the arms of Cmdr Fleming onboard HMS Fernie who would then take the fastest route back to Britain and ultimately deliver it to Bletchley Park.
6) The RAF were then ordered to bomb the port extensively while a squadron of Blenheim aircraft was to lay a large smoke screen to cover the evacuation of all the troops by sea from the town.
7) If all had gone as planned then the Germans would have assumed the raid was an attack on the gun positions and the radar station combined with harassment attacks in force upon the harbour fortifications.
8) The later RAF bombing of the town would destroy and cover up any evidence that this had just been a pinch raid to steal German Naval Intelligence.
Assuming the ruse had worked and the Germans did not think it wise to update their code books anyway, then Bletchley Park and Ultra would for a least awhile, be able to crack the 4 rotor Enigma and resume the reading of all encrypted radio traffic as they had been able to do in 1941. This act alone would have secured “Operation Torch”, the invasion of North Africa; protected our Atlantic supply routes from the U-Boat menace and enable Britain to stay well and truly at the fore front of the war, all for a negligible cost in human losses.
BUT: despite five months of intense planning; the raid failed miserably.
Why?
A combined mass of faults, over restrictive planning, poor security (the Germans new the raid was coming; double agents in France, agents at Newhaven port and Luftwaffe Recon flights spotted the shipping build up at Newhaven Port), the wrong tools (Churchill tanks were under gunned and not suited to chert pebble beaches) and weapons (they had nothing more powerful than the navies 4 inch guns), insufficient support from naval destroyers, lack of air superiority by RAF, very poor intelligence of dispositions for German defences in the port which totally missed the many cave emplacements in the cliffs overlooking main beach.
Not a single piece of German Intelligence made it out of Dieppe at all. But ironically both Brig. William Southam and Brig. Sherwood Lett landed on White Beach each with a full copy of the entire Jubilee military battle plan under their arms in waterproof packages. One of these was in German hands by nightfall and it basically told the German's the exact objectives for the assault; or did it?
The Germans were deeply suspicious of these documents and expressed the opinion that it was probably a deceptive plant. When one looks at this from what we now know of the raid then this almost certainly was; being used to draw the Germans away from the real purpose of the raid, the pinching of a naval 4 Rotor Enigma machine.
One can be more certain that this was indeed the case because of the function of a little known order within that same battle plan; this stated that “Where ever possible, prisoner’s hands will be tied to prevent destruction of their documents”.
This had a terrible knock on effect for the captured Canadian soldiers as the Germans felt that this was barbaric and contravened the Geneva Convention for the fair treatment of POW’s. As a result of this all Canadian POWs’ from the raid were to have their hands shackled from 8th October onward during daylight hours and this was enforced for exactly 1 year, 44 days and 45 minutes. Though after Red Cross intervention this ruling was some what relaxed in some camps.
If the battle plan that fell into German hands was a plant then what better way of informing British Intelligence that the plant had succeeded when reports from Canadian POW’s confirmed the hand shackling directive in response to the “barbaric” order contained in those very same documents?
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De classified documents relating to the role of the Hotel Moderne as a probable German Naval HQ. It has never really been established if it actually was!
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German soldiers on the western headland overlooking the main beach just after the raid. One can only guess how many Canadian soldiers these men had shot down that morning.
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Captured men photographed on Rue Jeanne d' Arc, Rouen having marched 40 miles from Dieppe.
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The German Position
Dieppe was defended by low category troops; the demands in Russia had taken away large well trained divisions of men. 2,500 men reinforced the town in July 1942 but these were such raw recruits that many knew little of basic army discipline. They were mainly “Volksdeutsch” ethnic Germans or plain foreigners.
Many were Polish ex army men who had been captured in 1939 and persuaded to fight for the Germans in return for non imprisonment. All were poor physical specimens and would not have passed a medical for the British army.
Amongst all of these men the French citizens noted that there were very few real hardened Nazis and generally they got on well with their oppressors in Dieppe.
In the autumn of 1941 the OT began to construct “Festung” (Fortress) Dieppe and concrete fortifications were built all round the town and both headlands were fortified by March 1942; the Dieppe garrison then consisted of only 1,500 men of the 571st Regiment there were strong reserves along the 50 mile coastal sector of another 6,000 men including the 10th Panzer Division at Amiens which was resting and recuperating after receiving a mauling in Russia.
The mile long stretch of main beach was defended by just 150 men of whom 15 were Polish; though maybe not the finest of physical specimens each one was capable of firing automatic weapons from behind concrete bunkers. The beach defence company also had eight 37 mm anti tanks guns and there were a plentiful number of mortar crews. The day prior to the landing all theses men had undergone extensive weapons training and range markers were still set up on main beach when the landings occurred. Added to this the allied soldiers came under very accurate sniper fire from well trained individuals so despite the intelligence view that the German defenders were of poor quality and number they did in fact put up a highly effective resistance.
On 20th July General Curt Haase issued a 15th Army order demanding “the highest degree of watchfulness and readiness for action” during three periods of favourable tide and moon; 27th July to 3rd August. 10th to 19 August and 25th August to 1st September. They knew "a" raid was coming for sure!
Dieppe was defended by low category troops; the demands in Russia had taken away large well trained divisions of men. 2,500 men reinforced the town in July 1942 but these were such raw recruits that many knew little of basic army discipline. They were mainly “Volksdeutsch” ethnic Germans or plain foreigners.
Many were Polish ex army men who had been captured in 1939 and persuaded to fight for the Germans in return for non imprisonment. All were poor physical specimens and would not have passed a medical for the British army.
Amongst all of these men the French citizens noted that there were very few real hardened Nazis and generally they got on well with their oppressors in Dieppe.
In the autumn of 1941 the OT began to construct “Festung” (Fortress) Dieppe and concrete fortifications were built all round the town and both headlands were fortified by March 1942; the Dieppe garrison then consisted of only 1,500 men of the 571st Regiment there were strong reserves along the 50 mile coastal sector of another 6,000 men including the 10th Panzer Division at Amiens which was resting and recuperating after receiving a mauling in Russia.
The mile long stretch of main beach was defended by just 150 men of whom 15 were Polish; though maybe not the finest of physical specimens each one was capable of firing automatic weapons from behind concrete bunkers. The beach defence company also had eight 37 mm anti tanks guns and there were a plentiful number of mortar crews. The day prior to the landing all theses men had undergone extensive weapons training and range markers were still set up on main beach when the landings occurred. Added to this the allied soldiers came under very accurate sniper fire from well trained individuals so despite the intelligence view that the German defenders were of poor quality and number they did in fact put up a highly effective resistance.
On 20th July General Curt Haase issued a 15th Army order demanding “the highest degree of watchfulness and readiness for action” during three periods of favourable tide and moon; 27th July to 3rd August. 10th to 19 August and 25th August to 1st September. They knew "a" raid was coming for sure!
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The Germans were later praised for their care of the wounded and captured men. Top Left: Prisoners resting on the towns football field. Right: A wounded man is carefully lifted off the beach at Puys. Bottom Left: A German propaganda poster depicting the carnage suffered by the Allies first invasion attempt upon the "iron coast".
Lord Louis Mountbatten
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John Hughes-Hallet
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John Hamilton Roberts
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Responsibility for the disaster rested with these men:
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
As head of Combined Operations he was probably cleared to “Ultra” level and new exactly what Dieppe was about as he sanctioned the raid back in April 1942. When repeatedly questioned about the failure he always claimed that “the Battle of Normandy was won on the beaches of Dieppe”; But it was later pointed out by Gen. Montgomery after the war that “We could have obtained the same information and experience without losing so many magnificent Canadian soldiers”. Mountbatten was treading a very narrow path between what he really knew and what he was allowed to actually say.
Capt. John Hughes-Hallett. Naval Force Commander. He was accused of supplying insufficient supporting firepower to cover the landings with the destroyers he did use being woefully inadequate for the job. It was later said that if just two large battleships had been deployed to bombard the shore defences with their 16 inch guns then the number of casualties would have been greatly reduced.
Major Gen. John Hamilton Roberts. The buck stopped at him. As Military Force Commander he was made the scapegoat for the failure. Though awarded the DSO for ability, courage and determination at Dieppe his reputation was shattered. He was replaced in 1943 and ended the war in command of a recruiting and reinforcement centre. Roberts was party to the final decision to abort HMS Locust’s run into the inner harbour and instead tried to send 40RM accompanied by the Fusiliers Mont-Royal French Canadian Force in over main beach. This fateful decision vilified him for the rest of his life.
And at the top: Winston Churchill. Under pressure he promised that a full inquiry into the failure of the Dieppe raid would be undertaken; no such inquiry ever took place. It was not overlooked that Churchill also ordered the amphibious attack at Gallipoli during WW1, another great failure. All those at the top were protected by the official secrets act and as such could not be held accountable.
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.
As head of Combined Operations he was probably cleared to “Ultra” level and new exactly what Dieppe was about as he sanctioned the raid back in April 1942. When repeatedly questioned about the failure he always claimed that “the Battle of Normandy was won on the beaches of Dieppe”; But it was later pointed out by Gen. Montgomery after the war that “We could have obtained the same information and experience without losing so many magnificent Canadian soldiers”. Mountbatten was treading a very narrow path between what he really knew and what he was allowed to actually say.
Capt. John Hughes-Hallett. Naval Force Commander. He was accused of supplying insufficient supporting firepower to cover the landings with the destroyers he did use being woefully inadequate for the job. It was later said that if just two large battleships had been deployed to bombard the shore defences with their 16 inch guns then the number of casualties would have been greatly reduced.
Major Gen. John Hamilton Roberts. The buck stopped at him. As Military Force Commander he was made the scapegoat for the failure. Though awarded the DSO for ability, courage and determination at Dieppe his reputation was shattered. He was replaced in 1943 and ended the war in command of a recruiting and reinforcement centre. Roberts was party to the final decision to abort HMS Locust’s run into the inner harbour and instead tried to send 40RM accompanied by the Fusiliers Mont-Royal French Canadian Force in over main beach. This fateful decision vilified him for the rest of his life.
And at the top: Winston Churchill. Under pressure he promised that a full inquiry into the failure of the Dieppe raid would be undertaken; no such inquiry ever took place. It was not overlooked that Churchill also ordered the amphibious attack at Gallipoli during WW1, another great failure. All those at the top were protected by the official secrets act and as such could not be held accountable.
In Conclusion
The Dieppe Raid landed squarely within the Official Secrets Act particularly with its connections to Bletchley Park and Ultra. All the main players were either Ultra cleared or otherwise high up in British Military Intelligence; all had signed the Official Secrets Act. The files pertaining to the sensitive details of the raid have remained closed to public scrutiny for 70 years and some have only now been released; it is this high level of secrecy that has undoubtably been the root cause of every account written about the raid being a total fallacy. It is perhaps somewhat beguiling that for those that took part in the raid and witnessed their colleagues being slaughtered on the pebble beaches of Dieppe, they may not live long enough to be informed about the real reasons for their colleagues ultimate sacrifice; they were pawns in a far bigger game and they did not know how absolutely essential that game was in the prosecution of the war in 1942. For the 75th anniversary we should poignantly remember all of those men who did not return from Dieppe and died not ever knowing why they were sent there.
The Dieppe Raid landed squarely within the Official Secrets Act particularly with its connections to Bletchley Park and Ultra. All the main players were either Ultra cleared or otherwise high up in British Military Intelligence; all had signed the Official Secrets Act. The files pertaining to the sensitive details of the raid have remained closed to public scrutiny for 70 years and some have only now been released; it is this high level of secrecy that has undoubtably been the root cause of every account written about the raid being a total fallacy. It is perhaps somewhat beguiling that for those that took part in the raid and witnessed their colleagues being slaughtered on the pebble beaches of Dieppe, they may not live long enough to be informed about the real reasons for their colleagues ultimate sacrifice; they were pawns in a far bigger game and they did not know how absolutely essential that game was in the prosecution of the war in 1942. For the 75th anniversary we should poignantly remember all of those men who did not return from Dieppe and died not ever knowing why they were sent there.
On a positive note what the raid did do was to force German attention into fortifying more of the northern French coast and into ultimately building the vast Atlantic Wall which up until the date of Dieppe was woefully incomplete. The resulting building program cost Germany vast amounts of manpower and materials all of which were vitally needed in the eastern war against Russia.
Therefore perhaps the most successful legacy of the Dieppe Raid was in forcing Hitler to defend three fronts; Africa, Russia and the Channel coast and then within six months a fourth, the aerial bombing of Germany itself. Whether lessons were learnt pertaining to D-Day remains unclear as the Normandy landings were a different “kettle of fish” altogether and largely the product of the extending military might of the allies some two years and much hard fighting experience later.
Therefore perhaps the most successful legacy of the Dieppe Raid was in forcing Hitler to defend three fronts; Africa, Russia and the Channel coast and then within six months a fourth, the aerial bombing of Germany itself. Whether lessons were learnt pertaining to D-Day remains unclear as the Normandy landings were a different “kettle of fish” altogether and largely the product of the extending military might of the allies some two years and much hard fighting experience later.
Items captured by the Germans after the raid:
29 Churchill Tanks, 7 Scout Cars, 1 Jeep, 1 Personnel Truck, 1,300 Rifles, 170 Machine Guns (Bren & Sten), 42 Boys Anti Tank Rifles, 70 light Mortars, 60 Heavy Mortars, and vast quantities of ammunition, explosives and clothing.
One wonders if the Germans actually reused any of this.
29 Churchill Tanks, 7 Scout Cars, 1 Jeep, 1 Personnel Truck, 1,300 Rifles, 170 Machine Guns (Bren & Sten), 42 Boys Anti Tank Rifles, 70 light Mortars, 60 Heavy Mortars, and vast quantities of ammunition, explosives and clothing.
One wonders if the Germans actually reused any of this.
Secrecy was probably a joke!
As Ross Munro of the Canadian Press pointed out, “Everyone was so confident in those July days that it would be a nice easy raid. One found oneself making complete plans to run around Dieppe as if it were a manoeuvre in Brighton - I even made a date to meet one of the sergeants from the Essex Scottish at the corner just outside German naval headquarters and get the latest dope from him there”.
This quote begs the question that if Ross Munro knew where the German Naval HQ was located in Dieppe back in July 1942 then exactly how secret was the raids primary objective at that time?
As Ross Munro of the Canadian Press pointed out, “Everyone was so confident in those July days that it would be a nice easy raid. One found oneself making complete plans to run around Dieppe as if it were a manoeuvre in Brighton - I even made a date to meet one of the sergeants from the Essex Scottish at the corner just outside German naval headquarters and get the latest dope from him there”.
This quote begs the question that if Ross Munro knew where the German Naval HQ was located in Dieppe back in July 1942 then exactly how secret was the raids primary objective at that time?
Ross Munro
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ABOVE & RIGHT: Safely back in Newhaven but the stature of these men suggests that they were reserve troops and did not land.
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Objective finally realised
Six months after the raid Bletchley Park finally broke the 4 rotor Enigma code due mainly to encoding mistakes by German cipher clerks that allowed the British to determine the wiring of the new rotor and this turned the tide of the war back in our favour. It must be said though that had Dieppe been successful even with the losses it incurred then countless more lives would have certainly been saved during the closing months of 1942 had Bletchley Park been able to read the German secret codes once more.
Below: The Hotel's Les Arcades and Moderne. Only the Hotel Les Arcades still trades as such today. The former Hotel Moderne is now private apartments and shops. Visiting the site today one can scarcely believe that Britain's war effort rested perilously on the contents of the building in the photograph below right.
Six months after the raid Bletchley Park finally broke the 4 rotor Enigma code due mainly to encoding mistakes by German cipher clerks that allowed the British to determine the wiring of the new rotor and this turned the tide of the war back in our favour. It must be said though that had Dieppe been successful even with the losses it incurred then countless more lives would have certainly been saved during the closing months of 1942 had Bletchley Park been able to read the German secret codes once more.
Below: The Hotel's Les Arcades and Moderne. Only the Hotel Les Arcades still trades as such today. The former Hotel Moderne is now private apartments and shops. Visiting the site today one can scarcely believe that Britain's war effort rested perilously on the contents of the building in the photograph below right.
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The Dieppe Raid Memorial Garden at Newhaven, East Sussex.
There are 783 interments at the Dieppe Vertus Canadian Military Cemetery each bearing the date of 19/8/42. Most were very young men who died far from home and who's lives were arguably wasted in a futile raid.
Sources: Dieppe Through The Lens By Hugh G. Henry Jr and Jean Paul Pallud. Dieppe 1942 By Ken Ford. Dieppe Tragedy to Triumph By Brig. General Denis Whitaker. Dieppe 1942 The Jubilee Disaster By Ronald Atkin. The National Archives, Kew. Newhaven Maritime Museum.
We greatly acknowledge the superb academic research work undertaken by
Canadian Military Historian Prof. David O' Keefe.
We greatly acknowledge the superb academic research work undertaken by
Canadian Military Historian Prof. David O' Keefe.
Copyright Steve Sullivan, June 2019
