The QL Decoy Sites
Cuckmere Valley, East Sussex
TV 5180 9840
The History of Decoy Sites
The concept of constructing various forms of ruse designed to confound and confuse enemy bomber crews had been the subject of debate since the very beginning of the war; hence the meeting convened at Bomber Command on September 17th 1939, at which the topic of discussion was the feasibility of establishing dummy or decoy airfields. The theory behind the idea being simply to produce fake targets and make them convincing enough to lure the enemy away from the authentic ones in the hope that they would bomb them instead.
The meeting came to the conclusion that the idea was indeed practical and on October 2nd preliminary plans for the construction of such sites were drawn up and submitted to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. Two days later the Air Ministry sanctioned the building of two dummy airfields, one for daylight use code named “K”, and the other for night time use, “Q”.
The man in charge of supervising these new measures was Colonel John Turner, who established his HQ at Shepperton film studios, where most of the work on the building of the sites was to take place.
By January 1940 one example of each dummy airfield had been completed and by the end of the month the actual organisation structure of the new counter measure had been drawn up. A ground organisation was formed dividing the country into four areas, to contain a total of 36 sites.
As each “K” site would serve as a “Q” site too, economies could be made and their use made more effective. Area “K1” would cover Scotland, Northumberland and Durham, with its HQ at Pitreavie Castle, Dumfermline. “K2” would cover Yorkshire and Lincolnshire down to Grantham and have its HQ at Linton-on-Ouse. “K3” would cover East Anglia and all counties west with its HQ at Mildenhall, while “K4” would take in all south eastern England and have its HQ at Uxbridge. Commanding Officers were not appointed until February 8th 1940.
Each site would have a complement of 1 Sergeant, 3 Corporals, 15 Aircraftsmen, 1 Driver and a 3cwt lorry. Training of the site crews would be undertaken at RAF Hook in Surrey.
The number of “K” sites gradually increased as time went on and by July 1940 it was 42 and by the beginning of 1941 the total number of fake airfield areas had risen from the original 4 to 13.
The concept of constructing various forms of ruse designed to confound and confuse enemy bomber crews had been the subject of debate since the very beginning of the war; hence the meeting convened at Bomber Command on September 17th 1939, at which the topic of discussion was the feasibility of establishing dummy or decoy airfields. The theory behind the idea being simply to produce fake targets and make them convincing enough to lure the enemy away from the authentic ones in the hope that they would bomb them instead.
The meeting came to the conclusion that the idea was indeed practical and on October 2nd preliminary plans for the construction of such sites were drawn up and submitted to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. Two days later the Air Ministry sanctioned the building of two dummy airfields, one for daylight use code named “K”, and the other for night time use, “Q”.
The man in charge of supervising these new measures was Colonel John Turner, who established his HQ at Shepperton film studios, where most of the work on the building of the sites was to take place.
By January 1940 one example of each dummy airfield had been completed and by the end of the month the actual organisation structure of the new counter measure had been drawn up. A ground organisation was formed dividing the country into four areas, to contain a total of 36 sites.
As each “K” site would serve as a “Q” site too, economies could be made and their use made more effective. Area “K1” would cover Scotland, Northumberland and Durham, with its HQ at Pitreavie Castle, Dumfermline. “K2” would cover Yorkshire and Lincolnshire down to Grantham and have its HQ at Linton-on-Ouse. “K3” would cover East Anglia and all counties west with its HQ at Mildenhall, while “K4” would take in all south eastern England and have its HQ at Uxbridge. Commanding Officers were not appointed until February 8th 1940.
Each site would have a complement of 1 Sergeant, 3 Corporals, 15 Aircraftsmen, 1 Driver and a 3cwt lorry. Training of the site crews would be undertaken at RAF Hook in Surrey.
The number of “K” sites gradually increased as time went on and by July 1940 it was 42 and by the beginning of 1941 the total number of fake airfield areas had risen from the original 4 to 13.
North Weald Aerodrome showing the false river and lake painted onto the airfield surface at the beginning of the war.
QL Sites:- Above: a simple airfield decoy showing landing lights, vehicle headlights and flare path illumination.
Right: A more sophisticated site pretending to be a railway marshaling yard complete with leaking blackouts, vehicle headlights, street lamps and hot coal embers. Once enemy bombers had seen the site all illumination would be discretely turned off and the lure set. |
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It was realised as the Germans perpetrated the blitz campaign against our cities that the night time “Q” sites were likely to be the most useful and to conjure up the effect of an airfield at night was to simulate the landing lights and flare paths of an active aerodrome. This called for inventiveness in recreating alternative ways of simulating both domestic lighting and poor black outing to fires and explosions where buildings looked as if they had been previously bombed.
The hope being that these effects would draw in more bombers to the fake airfield rather than a real one. By the end of 1941 “Q” sites had received 359 attacks while the real airfields were bombed 358 times; clearly the hard work was paying off and the dummy sites were working.
The question now raised in the wake of this success was, would the application of this ruse work for strategic civilian targets such as factories, towns and cities?
The hope being that these effects would draw in more bombers to the fake airfield rather than a real one. By the end of 1941 “Q” sites had received 359 attacks while the real airfields were bombed 358 times; clearly the hard work was paying off and the dummy sites were working.
The question now raised in the wake of this success was, would the application of this ruse work for strategic civilian targets such as factories, towns and cities?
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In The Box Of Tricks: Top Left; A mobile smoke generator for creating screens or burning buildings. Top Right: Red down lighting shining onto sand created dumped hot coal embers from steam engines. Bottom Left: Carbon Arc lamps under waterproof glass domes created short intense flashes like bomb detonations. Bottom Right: Wooden log baskets coated in paraffin or creosote looked like burning wild fires started by incendiary bombs.
Plans were drawn up to create decoys for the main armament factories and these proved worthwhile when the decoy for the Boulton Paul aircraft factory was bombed on August 14th 1940 while the real factory continued production of the Defiant night fighter.
The night time decoy sites needed to be very convincing and this is where the “QL” and “QF” versions came into being; the “QL” sites stood for night lighting and the “QF” sites stood for night fires; this is how they worked:
The QL site used electric lights to show leaking blackouts, car headlights, roof lights, railway stations and poorly lit streets and as soon as an approaching bomber force had been detected these lights were erratically extinguished. To the bomber crews this looked like a genuine target town or factory. When the first bombs began to fall and explode then the QF sites came into use creating false fires and explosions to simulate bomb detonations and raging fires in dummy buildings. If the ruse worked then the next wave of approaching aircraft would go on to drop their bombs on this site as well and perpetuate the illusion.
In all 75 private firms participated in the scheme with 16 extra sites protecting ordnance factories and by 1941 large decoy sites were protecting major industrial towns such as Sheffield, these were built on a three quarter scale and included simulations for rows of furnaces, two stretches of factory roadway and four marshaling yards.
Together, the “K” sites and “Q” sites and the dummy factories, proved their worth and between June and December 1940 there were 30 attacks on “K” sites , 174 attacks on “Q” sites and 23 against dummy factories.
The night time decoy sites needed to be very convincing and this is where the “QL” and “QF” versions came into being; the “QL” sites stood for night lighting and the “QF” sites stood for night fires; this is how they worked:
The QL site used electric lights to show leaking blackouts, car headlights, roof lights, railway stations and poorly lit streets and as soon as an approaching bomber force had been detected these lights were erratically extinguished. To the bomber crews this looked like a genuine target town or factory. When the first bombs began to fall and explode then the QF sites came into use creating false fires and explosions to simulate bomb detonations and raging fires in dummy buildings. If the ruse worked then the next wave of approaching aircraft would go on to drop their bombs on this site as well and perpetuate the illusion.
In all 75 private firms participated in the scheme with 16 extra sites protecting ordnance factories and by 1941 large decoy sites were protecting major industrial towns such as Sheffield, these were built on a three quarter scale and included simulations for rows of furnaces, two stretches of factory roadway and four marshaling yards.
Together, the “K” sites and “Q” sites and the dummy factories, proved their worth and between June and December 1940 there were 30 attacks on “K” sites , 174 attacks on “Q” sites and 23 against dummy factories.
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Also in the box of tricks: Top Left: Shuttered lighting looked like roof skylights with poor black outing. Top Right: Massive burning bales looked like houses and streets set well alight. Bottom Left: Oil fires where water was deliberately pored into tanks of burning oil created large explosion flashes simulating blast bombs exploding.
Bottom Right: The Cuckmere River estuary that became the QL Site for Newhaven Port photographed in 1934.
Bottom Right: The Cuckmere River estuary that became the QL Site for Newhaven Port photographed in 1934.
A typical Starfish site built to emulate a large town or city and would only be lit at the precise moment the fires in the real bombed town or city were extinguished.
The successes of these decoy sites lead to the creation of the far bigger “Special Fires” sites coded “SF” or “Starfish”. They came about with the appalling and devastating raid on Coventry on November 14th 1940. Validated at a meeting with the Air Ministry on November 23rd control went to No. 80 Wing RAF and initially sites were selected in open country to protect the cities of Sheffield, Derby, Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry and Crewe and by 18th December 18 sites were available.
Starfish Sites comprised a building-like structure of timber and metal frame covered in hessian on the sides and roof. Inside were usually two drums packed with highly combustible material such as coal, paraffin, petrol or creosote which varied the colour and intensity of the fires and smoke that they produced. The whole was clad in asbestos sheeting to allow it to be used several times.
Positioned in groups of three around the intended target at a distance of four miles or so, the sites were supposed to be ignited as soon as the real target came under attack, much the same as “QF”s. Each site was in telephonic communication with local control but was only permitted to light the site under special circumstances. Real control was vested in 80 Wing RAF, who would give the order to actually fire the site.
They were ignited electrically from a concrete post about 600 yards away and in most cases allowance was made for reserve sites that could be used three nights running in case of a sustained attack. Timing was absolutely critical as the raider had to see the Starfish site before spotting the real target and sites were positioned so that enemy aircraft had to fly over them to get to the real town selected for attack.
The first Starfish was fired on December 2nd 1940, during an attack on Bristol, when the decoy attracted 66 HE bombs and a number of incendiaries. Not all results were satisfying however. From December 1940 to March 1941 36 sites were ignited and on only four occasions were the results considered excellent, i.e. having attracted between 50 and 100 bombs. During the same period there were also fair results (8 to 20 bombs) and 11 poor result sites and 10 with no bombs at all.
One of the more spectacular successes was on the night of April 17-18th 1941 when Portsmouth was raided and 90% of the bombs aimed at the city fell on the Starfish decoy site on Hayling Island.
By March 1941 there were 108 Starfish Sites, by April 130, 143 in June and 164 by December. With the Luftwaffe switching to the Soviet Union and the Blitz subsiding most “K” sites were dismantled, the “Q” sites lasted longer and by the end of 1941 73 civilian “QF”’s and 170 “QL”’s were still active. This changed again when the German Baedeker raids started in March 1942 when 209 Starfish and 168 “Q” sites continued to deceive but on conclusion of this offensive in October 1942 these too were subject to resource vetting and all had closed by the end of 1943.
Starfish Sites comprised a building-like structure of timber and metal frame covered in hessian on the sides and roof. Inside were usually two drums packed with highly combustible material such as coal, paraffin, petrol or creosote which varied the colour and intensity of the fires and smoke that they produced. The whole was clad in asbestos sheeting to allow it to be used several times.
Positioned in groups of three around the intended target at a distance of four miles or so, the sites were supposed to be ignited as soon as the real target came under attack, much the same as “QF”s. Each site was in telephonic communication with local control but was only permitted to light the site under special circumstances. Real control was vested in 80 Wing RAF, who would give the order to actually fire the site.
They were ignited electrically from a concrete post about 600 yards away and in most cases allowance was made for reserve sites that could be used three nights running in case of a sustained attack. Timing was absolutely critical as the raider had to see the Starfish site before spotting the real target and sites were positioned so that enemy aircraft had to fly over them to get to the real town selected for attack.
The first Starfish was fired on December 2nd 1940, during an attack on Bristol, when the decoy attracted 66 HE bombs and a number of incendiaries. Not all results were satisfying however. From December 1940 to March 1941 36 sites were ignited and on only four occasions were the results considered excellent, i.e. having attracted between 50 and 100 bombs. During the same period there were also fair results (8 to 20 bombs) and 11 poor result sites and 10 with no bombs at all.
One of the more spectacular successes was on the night of April 17-18th 1941 when Portsmouth was raided and 90% of the bombs aimed at the city fell on the Starfish decoy site on Hayling Island.
By March 1941 there were 108 Starfish Sites, by April 130, 143 in June and 164 by December. With the Luftwaffe switching to the Soviet Union and the Blitz subsiding most “K” sites were dismantled, the “Q” sites lasted longer and by the end of 1941 73 civilian “QF”’s and 170 “QL”’s were still active. This changed again when the German Baedeker raids started in March 1942 when 209 Starfish and 168 “Q” sites continued to deceive but on conclusion of this offensive in October 1942 these too were subject to resource vetting and all had closed by the end of 1943.
ABOVE: A map showing the eastern area of Britain and the various locations of Decoy Sites. Marked in Blue is the Cuckmere QL Site and in Green the nearest Starfish Site located at Alciston, built to protect the county town of Lewes.
In conclusion, it should also be acknowledged that the Germans were using their Knickebein radio beam system to locate British targets at night. This system allowed the pilot of a bomber to fly along a radio beam and upon reaching a 2nd cross beam located above the target he was to release his bombs thereby hitting his target accurately. These two beams could be radiated from any of 11 powerful transmitters located in Germany and occupied France, Holland and Norway. Alignment could be set to target any location in Britain.
A trained bomber crew following this navigational method would not easily be fooled by the decoy sites except for a tiny flaw in the system; The German’s knew that we knew about the beams existence and though we could “jam” the beam the more effective solution came about when German pilots realised that British night fighters could also fly along the beams to find them and shoot them down. Knowing this most German bomber pilots refused to use Knickebein at all and were all the more vulnerable to our decoy sites for that reason.
A trained bomber crew following this navigational method would not easily be fooled by the decoy sites except for a tiny flaw in the system; The German’s knew that we knew about the beams existence and though we could “jam” the beam the more effective solution came about when German pilots realised that British night fighters could also fly along the beams to find them and shoot them down. Knowing this most German bomber pilots refused to use Knickebein at all and were all the more vulnerable to our decoy sites for that reason.
The Knickebein beam transmitter situated at Stollberg in
Schleswig Holstein. The aerial array was about 100ft high and
315ft wide. It rested on railway bogies around its perimeter
track and could be aligned onto any target in Great Britain.
Radio receivers in the bombing aircraft would pick up the
beam and then fly along its length until a second transmitters
beam, located some mile away and radiated above the
intended target, would tell the pilot of the bomber when he
should release his bombs.
Schleswig Holstein. The aerial array was about 100ft high and
315ft wide. It rested on railway bogies around its perimeter
track and could be aligned onto any target in Great Britain.
Radio receivers in the bombing aircraft would pick up the
beam and then fly along its length until a second transmitters
beam, located some mile away and radiated above the
intended target, would tell the pilot of the bomber when he
should release his bombs.
Cuckmere Valley Decoy Sites
Unfortunately there is little evidence today to show us what the Cuckmere decoy site looked like and indeed where it was precisely located. It was probably a QL site and there may well have been two such sites planned, one North of the A259 and the other next to the Cuckmere river estuary, well south of the A259. There are two surviving maps of these proposed sites but each are devoid of accurate surveys; our best guess comes from aerial photography of the area dated 1940 to 1947 which vaguely show the southern most site.
During the war the Exceat cable station operated from a Nissen hut in roadside banking beside the A259 and cables ran to Cuckmere Haven and later to Hope Gap. Nearby a small night shelter (now thought to be concealed in an embankment) in the public house car park housed the equipment for operating the Cuckmere decoy lighting site. The main decoy controls were sited in a no longer existent brick pillbox, under the Downs near Comp Barn, at the K (airfield) and SF (Starfish) category decoy sites at Alciston.
Just how many times this site was used and to what extent it was successful may never be known and though it is generally documented that it was built to protect Newhaven port it might equally have been built to protect Friston aerodrome with the northern site perhaps replicating this nearby RAF airfield.
We have included period photographs of the types of fires and lighting employed at decoy sites together with an aerial view of a larger Starfish Site and the following narrative drawn from declassified secret reports tells us much about the planning and implementation of RAF Decoy Sites in Sussex.
Unfortunately there is little evidence today to show us what the Cuckmere decoy site looked like and indeed where it was precisely located. It was probably a QL site and there may well have been two such sites planned, one North of the A259 and the other next to the Cuckmere river estuary, well south of the A259. There are two surviving maps of these proposed sites but each are devoid of accurate surveys; our best guess comes from aerial photography of the area dated 1940 to 1947 which vaguely show the southern most site.
During the war the Exceat cable station operated from a Nissen hut in roadside banking beside the A259 and cables ran to Cuckmere Haven and later to Hope Gap. Nearby a small night shelter (now thought to be concealed in an embankment) in the public house car park housed the equipment for operating the Cuckmere decoy lighting site. The main decoy controls were sited in a no longer existent brick pillbox, under the Downs near Comp Barn, at the K (airfield) and SF (Starfish) category decoy sites at Alciston.
Just how many times this site was used and to what extent it was successful may never be known and though it is generally documented that it was built to protect Newhaven port it might equally have been built to protect Friston aerodrome with the northern site perhaps replicating this nearby RAF airfield.
We have included period photographs of the types of fires and lighting employed at decoy sites together with an aerial view of a larger Starfish Site and the following narrative drawn from declassified secret reports tells us much about the planning and implementation of RAF Decoy Sites in Sussex.
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LEFT: 1946 RAF aerial photograph showing the area of the decoy site highlighted by us in Blue; Brown area shows what looks like three or four bomb craters?
RIGHT: A modern oblique aerial view, orange marks the decoy site; blue anti tank ditches and walls; red location of known and probable control pill boxes. |
The southern most area of the decoy site location with the pill box on the right an anti invasion defence.
Decoy sites policy and planning
Extracts of Ministry and Armed Services communications, sourced from official documents, indicate the development of coastal decoy sites.
In late September 1942 the Air Ministry indicated that they had site-searchers out evaluating potential decoy sites. Looking at maps and from personal knowledge they provided the following information as a guide, but they were sending out site-searchers again.
POOLE: Already covered by the Navy; to discuss with them to see if cover is sufficient.
BEAULIEU RIVER: Not reconnoitred. Maps show the potential was considerably hampered by a new aerodrome.
SOUTHAMPTON: Heavily covered although another site was being surveyed.
LEE ON SOLENT, STOKES BAY: Not found very suitable previously and the area was being searched again.
CHICHESTER: Considerable development was thought possible, provided that sites did not clash with new marine hards etc.
LITTLEHAMPTON: Unlikely due to local conditions and existing development already.
SHOREHAM: Considered impossible due to existing installations.
NEWHAVEN, SEAFORD: This area was considered reasonable, possibly to the east of Seaford.
Extracts of Ministry and Armed Services communications, sourced from official documents, indicate the development of coastal decoy sites.
In late September 1942 the Air Ministry indicated that they had site-searchers out evaluating potential decoy sites. Looking at maps and from personal knowledge they provided the following information as a guide, but they were sending out site-searchers again.
POOLE: Already covered by the Navy; to discuss with them to see if cover is sufficient.
BEAULIEU RIVER: Not reconnoitred. Maps show the potential was considerably hampered by a new aerodrome.
SOUTHAMPTON: Heavily covered although another site was being surveyed.
LEE ON SOLENT, STOKES BAY: Not found very suitable previously and the area was being searched again.
CHICHESTER: Considerable development was thought possible, provided that sites did not clash with new marine hards etc.
LITTLEHAMPTON: Unlikely due to local conditions and existing development already.
SHOREHAM: Considered impossible due to existing installations.
NEWHAVEN, SEAFORD: This area was considered reasonable, possibly to the east of Seaford.
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ABOVE left and right: Two maps which tell us a little about where both the decoys sites at Cuckmere were to be located. The northern most one on the right was never built but the Cuckmere estuary one at left, was instigated though very little remains to be seen of it today.
RIGHT: Newhaven Port of present day and the reason why in 1940 the decoy sites were planned four miles to the east in the Cuckmere Valley.
RIGHT: Newhaven Port of present day and the reason why in 1940 the decoy sites were planned four miles to the east in the Cuckmere Valley.
In early October 1942 the Air Ministry noted that they thought the only place that they would fall foul of the Army was Cuckmere Haven; there were Training Ground Headquarters Staff there, but they had told one of the site-finders that the Army would be prepared to move if necessary.
It was felt the area had great potential to represent Newhaven if they could get complete access to the Cuckmere River. They were sending down a Colonel to discuss the matter locally and hoped there would be no great difficulty. Would those concerned be good enough to have the Home Forces view on this scheme as soon as possible?
In the first week of October 1942. Colonel Turner's secretive department, c/o Shepperton Studios Middlesex, wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, HM Dockyards, Portsmouth, indicating his priorities on decoy site development.
No 1. Cuckmere Haven, Cuckmere River. Guarding Newhaven (two sites initially).
No 2. Pagham Harbour.
No 3. Chichester Harbour Group including Exbury Bridge, Itchenor, Cobnor
Point. Suggested that for the protection of Chichester Harbour the decoy at
Pagham Harbour should be used on a thick night and the decoys in
Chichester Harbour on a bright night.
No 4. Crockford Bridge and Sowley Pond to imitate Beaulieu River.
No 5. Pennington Marshes to guard Lymington.
No 6. Chilling to protect Lee on Solent and Stokes Bay.
No 7. Dibden Bay as an additional protection to Southampton.
On October 19th 1942. Colonel Turner's department declared that it was understood that the Air Ministry intended to erect a decoy site near Cuckmere quite close to the cable terminal station at Exceat Bridge. In view of the operational importance of this site it was considered extremely undesirable to attract enemy attention to the area. May they please have their comments on this subject as early as possible?
Five days later Colonel Turner's Department wrote to GPO Engineering Dept, Dollis Hill, copy to War Office and GHQ Home Forces, that further to their conversation of October 21st 1942 they enclosed 6 inch map plans showing the location of the site and the safety area at 400 yards to the west of it and 600 yards from Exceat Bridge. If they agreed to their using site No 24 Colonel Turner was prepared to give up site No 23, just north of Exceat Bridge, for the present.
Thus initially two sites, numbered 23 and 24, were planned for the Cuckmere Valley. Eventually the inland plot north of Exceat bridge No 23 was dropped in favour of site No 24 south of the bridge towards the Cuckmere estuary.
In early 1942 a decoy lighting site at Alciston was completed as No. 91 and the Civil Defence Controller informed his Lewes opposite number in a 'Most Secret' letter. On June 24th 1942 a decoy site No SF 77 at Frant was completed as a type TSF layout and on July 9th 1942 another TSF type No SF 78 was finished at Rye near Camber Castle. Additional sites were announced on November 12th 1942 as TSF 79 at Alciston, No 604 at Cuckmere River and No 605 at Cuckmere Haven; then on November 28th another map reference was forwarded for the Cuckmere QL site No 605.
On February 23rd the QL sites at Nos 604 and 605 at Cuckmere were deleted and No 651 added for Camber Castle. (A WWII sectional Stanton shelter, now rarely found, can be seen at TQ 918188 beside a footpath and is a clue to the location of the Camber decoy site that may have been controlled from this Stanton hut.)
On May 3rd 1943 the Civil Defence Controller wrote noting his error and that all previous three sites were reinstated - a month later he wrote again with fresh map references. QL site No 604 at Cuckmere was dropped altogether on December 7th 1943. In March 1944 site No. 91 was detailed in case of an attack on Lewes, under the control of the Naval Officer in Charge at Newhaven and concerned a four mile radius around Lewes.
Interestingly a Civil Defence letter of April 25th 1944 noted two sites for a QF arrangement at Cuckmere Haven and an unspecified type easterly at Pett Level, although this could have related to the flooding of the Colonel Body Memorial Lakes, around TQ 901150. Three days later it was officially noted that Cuckmere Haven map references applied to two sites that would probably not be operated simultaneously and that the Air Ministry was not concerned just which of the pair applied provided the correct No 605 was given.
On August 7th the Pett Level decoy No 654 was deleted and on February 5th four Sussex TSF and QL sites at Alciston and Camber Castle were abandoned and then on March 13th 1945 the Regional Civil Defence office declared that all the East Sussex decoys had been deleted.
It was felt the area had great potential to represent Newhaven if they could get complete access to the Cuckmere River. They were sending down a Colonel to discuss the matter locally and hoped there would be no great difficulty. Would those concerned be good enough to have the Home Forces view on this scheme as soon as possible?
In the first week of October 1942. Colonel Turner's secretive department, c/o Shepperton Studios Middlesex, wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, HM Dockyards, Portsmouth, indicating his priorities on decoy site development.
No 1. Cuckmere Haven, Cuckmere River. Guarding Newhaven (two sites initially).
No 2. Pagham Harbour.
No 3. Chichester Harbour Group including Exbury Bridge, Itchenor, Cobnor
Point. Suggested that for the protection of Chichester Harbour the decoy at
Pagham Harbour should be used on a thick night and the decoys in
Chichester Harbour on a bright night.
No 4. Crockford Bridge and Sowley Pond to imitate Beaulieu River.
No 5. Pennington Marshes to guard Lymington.
No 6. Chilling to protect Lee on Solent and Stokes Bay.
No 7. Dibden Bay as an additional protection to Southampton.
On October 19th 1942. Colonel Turner's department declared that it was understood that the Air Ministry intended to erect a decoy site near Cuckmere quite close to the cable terminal station at Exceat Bridge. In view of the operational importance of this site it was considered extremely undesirable to attract enemy attention to the area. May they please have their comments on this subject as early as possible?
Five days later Colonel Turner's Department wrote to GPO Engineering Dept, Dollis Hill, copy to War Office and GHQ Home Forces, that further to their conversation of October 21st 1942 they enclosed 6 inch map plans showing the location of the site and the safety area at 400 yards to the west of it and 600 yards from Exceat Bridge. If they agreed to their using site No 24 Colonel Turner was prepared to give up site No 23, just north of Exceat Bridge, for the present.
Thus initially two sites, numbered 23 and 24, were planned for the Cuckmere Valley. Eventually the inland plot north of Exceat bridge No 23 was dropped in favour of site No 24 south of the bridge towards the Cuckmere estuary.
In early 1942 a decoy lighting site at Alciston was completed as No. 91 and the Civil Defence Controller informed his Lewes opposite number in a 'Most Secret' letter. On June 24th 1942 a decoy site No SF 77 at Frant was completed as a type TSF layout and on July 9th 1942 another TSF type No SF 78 was finished at Rye near Camber Castle. Additional sites were announced on November 12th 1942 as TSF 79 at Alciston, No 604 at Cuckmere River and No 605 at Cuckmere Haven; then on November 28th another map reference was forwarded for the Cuckmere QL site No 605.
On February 23rd the QL sites at Nos 604 and 605 at Cuckmere were deleted and No 651 added for Camber Castle. (A WWII sectional Stanton shelter, now rarely found, can be seen at TQ 918188 beside a footpath and is a clue to the location of the Camber decoy site that may have been controlled from this Stanton hut.)
On May 3rd 1943 the Civil Defence Controller wrote noting his error and that all previous three sites were reinstated - a month later he wrote again with fresh map references. QL site No 604 at Cuckmere was dropped altogether on December 7th 1943. In March 1944 site No. 91 was detailed in case of an attack on Lewes, under the control of the Naval Officer in Charge at Newhaven and concerned a four mile radius around Lewes.
Interestingly a Civil Defence letter of April 25th 1944 noted two sites for a QF arrangement at Cuckmere Haven and an unspecified type easterly at Pett Level, although this could have related to the flooding of the Colonel Body Memorial Lakes, around TQ 901150. Three days later it was officially noted that Cuckmere Haven map references applied to two sites that would probably not be operated simultaneously and that the Air Ministry was not concerned just which of the pair applied provided the correct No 605 was given.
On August 7th the Pett Level decoy No 654 was deleted and on February 5th four Sussex TSF and QL sites at Alciston and Camber Castle were abandoned and then on March 13th 1945 the Regional Civil Defence office declared that all the East Sussex decoys had been deleted.
The entire story of the decoy program to deceive German bomber pilots into off loading their bombs onto worthless feints has been seriously understated in the history of the Home Front during the second world war. Though we know that not all decoy sites were successful one can not put a value on the number of civilian lives these rudimentary deceptions undoubtedly saved where the decoy site did work. Sadly nothing remains today largely due to the nature of these sites not having permanent buildings, for us to examine them and perhaps leave a credit of respect to Colonel Turner and his team for their persistence and foresight of inventiveness for a tool that proved to be absolutely invaluable in Britain’s Home Defence Strategy between 1940 and 1944. The photograph above shows the enigmatic Cuckmere River winding its way timelessly through the past and present.
With thanks to: National Archives, Kew. English Heritage Aerial Photo Library. Historical Archive, Lewes.
Copyright Steve Sullivan, January 2020
